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JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal fiom a final oidei enteied on Januaiy 27, 1999, by Judge Pat
B Rn in of the Thud Judicial Distnct Couit in and foi Summit County, State of Utah
!UM diction of this Couit is appiopnate puisuant to Utah Constitution ait VIII, sec 3, and
UtalUode Ann §78-2-2(1998)
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1

Did the tiial couit en m dnecting a veidict against plaintiffs' indemnification

Uauns on the basis of its belief that theie was no evidence of damages, wheie the tiial couit
tailed to \ lew the evidence in the light most favoiable to plaintiffs, ovetlooked e\ idence in
the iccoid of \anous unieimbuised expenses and losses co\eied b) the Indemnification
\g\ cement and mistakenly focused instead on plaintiffs' piofit on the sale of the undei lying
'o\\ niopeitv which in no wa\ lediessed the unieimbuised losses foi which plaintiffs weie
indemnified and entitled to lecovei 9
Standard of Re\iew:
fc

[0]n appeal fiom a dnected veidict, we must examine the e\ idence in the light most

laxoiable to the losing paity, and if theie is a leasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inleien.es to be diawn theiefiom that would support a judgment in fa\oi of the losing part)
the dnected veidict cannot be sustained
Assoc

,M

Gouidmv Shaion's Cultuial Educ Recieational

(S45 P 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm v Giaystone Pines,

(o2 P 2d 896 898 (Utah 1982))

1

2.

Did the trial court err in directing a verdict and dismissing plaintiffs'

indemnification claims on the grounds that plaintiffs allegedly did not introduce evidence of
actual damages, where defendant's breach of the Indemnification Agreement in itself entitled
plaintiffs to recover nominal damages?
Standard of Review:
"[OJn appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
lnlerenees 10 be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing party,
the dnected verdict cannot be sustained."' Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational
Assoc. 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines,
652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)).
3.

Did the trial court err in directing a verdict and dismissing plaintiffs' claims

of breach of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement by failing to find that defendant's promises
contained theiem to make various improvements to the property after closing were promises
collateral to the contract of sale, and thus, were not extinguished by the merger doctrine nor
by the Agreement's abrogation clause?
Standard of Review:
"[0]n appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
infeiences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing party,

2

the dncctcd veidict cannot be sustained "' Gouidin v Shaion' s Cultuial Educ Recieational
V^soc , 845 P 2d 242, 243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Management Comm v Giaystone Pines,
(o2 P 2d 896 898 (Utah 1982))
4

In light of the tnal couit's impiopei giant of dnected \eidict, did the tnal couit

ilso en in aw aiding attorneys fees to defendant ?
Standard of Review:
Whethei attorney fees aie iecoveiablc in an action is a question of law, which we
icuew foi conectness " Valcaicev Fitzgeiald, 961 P 2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) See also
Robeitson v Gem Ins Co : 828 P 2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct App 1992)
SIATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

INTRODUCTION
This Couit should ie\eise the tnal couit's decision to giant a dnected \eidict, vacate

its aw aid of attorney's fees to defendant C Michael Nielsen ("Nielsen") and lemand this
case loi fuithei pioceedings This case involves Nielsen's failuie to fulfill piomises and
obligations contained within an Earnest Money Sales Agieement and Indemnification
Vgieement
This case aiose out of Nielsen's sale to Justin and Kimbeily Pavoni (the "Paxonis")
of a 20-acie paicel of pioperty in the Red Hawk Subdivision in Park City, Utah (heieinaftei
the piopeity")(R at 916 921, 948, T n a l ! I pp 77-78, 97-98, 206, Pi's Tnal Exs 1 & 1A
Dei \ Tnal b \ 6 ) The piopeity was an ideal site loi the Pavoni's dieam home, and the

3

Pa\ onis bargained with Nielsen and agreed in writing as part of the purchase agreement that
they would be able to build their home at a specifically identified prime location on the 20acrepaicel. (R. at 917-19, 1000-01; Trial Tr., pp 81-92, 413-418; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.)
Nielsen sold the property and the Pavonis agreed to buy it with the understanding that there
would be nothing that would interfere with their planned home site and use of the property.
(R. at 920-21, 943-44, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 93-98, 186-88, 417.)
Shortly before closing, however, Nielsen advised the Pavonis for the first time that
neighboring property owners (the Calls) were claiming a right of way easement over the
Pa\onf s property. (R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94.) Nielsen knew, and had known for some
time, that the claimed easement went through the Pavonfs planned home site, but he did not
disclose this to the Pavonis. (R. at 920, 975; Trial Tr., pp. 96, 314-15). Instead, Nielsen
minimized the issue and told the Pavonis that the Call easement would not be a problem,
because he would take care of the situation. (R. at 920, 944, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 94, 188,
417.) Nielsen gave the Pavonis an Indemnification Agreement promising to defend and
indemnify them against all losses and damages of any sort whatsoever that might arise out
oi the Calls1 claim to an easement over the Pavoni's property. (R. at 920-21, 943-44, 100103; Trial Tr., pp. 187-90, 341-42, 390-391, 416-427; PL's Trial Ex. 4.)
Based on Nielsen's representations and the promises contained in the purchase and
indemnification agreements, the Pavonis purchased the property for SI 15,000 in July 1992.
(R. at 921, 1001; Trial Tr., pp. 98-99, 416-17.) In the ensuing two-years, in preparation for
ultimately building their home on the property, the Pavonis made many improvements to the
4

20-acre parcel, greatly increasing its value. (R. at 923-24, 930-31, 933-37, 963; Trial Ti\, pp.
106-12, 133-38, 146-63, 264; Pi's Trial Exs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 29.) In the meantime, the value
of property in this subdivision also escalated generally. (R. at 977; Trial Tr., p. 323.)
After the Pavonis purchased the property, Nielsen-instead of resolving the Calls'
claim of an easement in favor of the Pavonis by extinguishing any claim of an easement over
the property-settled the Call litigation in July 1994 and granted the Calls an easement
affecting up to 2 acres of the Pavoni's 20-acre plot. (R. at 6, 925, 927, 929, 996-97; Trial Tr.,
pp. 113-14, 121-22, 130-31, 396-99; Def.'s Trial Ex. 9.)

Most egregiously, the Call

easement went directly through the Pavoni's planned home site. (Id.) Nielsen admitted at
trial that the Pavoni's property burdened with an easement was obviously worth less than the
Pa\oni's property without an easement. (R. at 974, 977-78; Trial Tr., pp. 309-11, 321-27.)
Nielsen estimated the minimum reduction in value to be at least "a couple of thousand
dollars." (R. at 981; Trial Tr., p. 336.) Nielsen's conservative estimate—which itself
concedes that the Pavonis were damaged—does not account for the fact that the Pavonis were
prevented from building their home at the location they selected.
Faced with the imposition of an easement on the property running through their
agreed upon home site, the Pavonis decided, in September 1994, to sell the property and
attempt to recover their losses and damages caused by Nielsen. (R. at 963; Trial Tr., pp. 26667.) Reflecting the improvements that the Pavonis made to the property and the generally
escalating land prices, the property was eventually appraised at $285,000. (R. at 963; Trial
Tr., p. 266.) The Pavonis were ultimately able to sell the property for $282,500, or $2,500
5

less than the appraised value. (R. at 963; Trial Ti\, pp. 266-67.) The Pavonis were never
repaid for the diminution in value, nor were they repaid for the costs of architectural plans
that they had paid to layout the planned home site on the property, nor for all of the
attorne\ *s fees that they had incurred in attempting to defend against the Call litigation and
resulting easement. (R. at 921-22, 930, 940-41; Trial Ti\, pp. 100-02, 172-77; PL's Trial Exs.
35A&35B.)
In addition, Nielsen did not fulfill his obligations contained within the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement, including his promise to install a gravel driveway and widen the driveway.
(R. at 921, 923, 930, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 106-08, 133-35, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.)
SpccificalK, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement provided, inter alia, that Nielsen would
install additional three-inch gravel from the driveway entrance to twenty feet beyond the
western-most boundary of the Pavoni's selected home site within one hundred twenty days
after the closing date. (R. at 919, 923, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 90-91, 106, 279; PL's Trial Exs.
1 & 1 A.) Nielsen failed to install the above-described gravel road as promised, and ten
months after the road was supposed to have been completed, the Pavonis paid approximately
$4,500 to have it installed. (R. at 921, 923, 930; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 106-08, 133-35; PL's
Trial Ex. 7.) The Pavonis asked Nielsen to reimburse them for the cost of installing the
gravel road, but Nielsen refused to pay. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement also provided
that Nielsen would widen and straighten the driveway entrance. (R. at 924, 966; Trial Tr.,
pp. 110, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.) Nielsen did not widen or straighten the driveway
entrance to the property as promised. (R. at 924; Trial Tr., p. 110.)
6

Therefore, the Pavonis filed suit against Nielsen seeking to recover for breach of these
agreements, and also seeking recovery against Nielsen for fraudulent misrepresentations. (R.
at 1-32 ) At trial, despite evidence of Nielsen's breach and the damages related thereto,
including Nielsen's own admission of a diminution in the property's value as a result of the
Call easement, the trial court directed a \erdict against the Pavonis on the Indemnification
Agreement, finding that because they had made a profit on the sale of the property, they were
not entitled to recovery. (R. at 610-15, 1011; Trial Tr., pp. 458-59.)

The trial court

overlooked the fact that the Call casement had diminished the property's value (R. at 974,
977-78; Trial Tr., pp. 309-11, 321-27), and also overlooked proof that the Pa\onis had not
been repaid for the various costs that they had incurred for architectural plans and attorney's
fees that went for naught in light of Nielsen's resolution of the Call litigation. (R. at 921-22,
930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp. 100-01, 172-77; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.)
In addition, the trial court directed a verdict and dismissed the Pavoni's claims under
the 1 arnest Money Sales Agreement, finding that all promises and undertakings of the
farnest Money Sales Agreement had merged into the deed of conveyance and been
extinguished. (R. at 610-15, 1008; Trial Tr., pp. 444-47.)

In doing so. the trial court

overlooked the fact that the Pavonis sought to enforce promises in the Earnest Money Sales
Agi cement that were collateral to and that were to be honored after the date of conveyance,
and thus, were not extinguished by the conveyance itself. The trial court also ordered the
Pavonis to pay Nielsen's attorney's fees because the Indemnification Agreement included
within it a wtpre\ailing party" clause. (R. at 790-95.)
7

After the Court entered an order formalizing its directed verdict rulings and findings
and entitlement to attorney's fees in favor of Nielsen, the Pavonis timely filed this appeal.
(R. at 822-24.) Subsequently, the trial court entered an order reflecting the amount of
attorney's fees to be S48,267.25. (Addendum at 10) The Pavonis have also appealed that
order and have moved to consolidate the two appeals and address the common issues in this
single brief. (Addendum at 11, 14, 15)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On January 23, 1995, the Pavonis sued Nielsen for (1) breach of the Earnest Money

Sales Agreement; (2) breach of the Pa\oni Indemnity Agreement; (3) fraud; and (4) an
accounting of monies paid to the Red Hawk Home Owner's Association. (R. at 1-32.) The
Pax onis filed an Amended Complaint and Jury Demand on September 16, 1996. (R. at 72105.) The case was tried before a jury on September 1 and 3, 1998. (R. at 897-1013.) At
the conclusion of the Pavoni's case, Judge Brian granted Nielsen's motion for directed
\erdict and dismissed all of the Pavoni's claims, except the fraud claim. (R. at 610-15, 10081 1; Trial Tr., pp. 444-59.) The fraud claim was presented to the jury, and the jury returned
a verdict in fax or of Nielsen. (R. at 555-56.)
On Januar\ 28, 1999, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
I aw and Order, wherein the court memorialized its decision to dismiss the Pavoni's claims
for breach of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Indemnity Agreement and also

8

aw arded Nielsen his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Indemnity Agreement.1 (R. at
790-95.) The Pavonis filed the instant appeal on February 26, 1999. (R. at 822-24.) On
April 27, 1999, the trial court issued a judgment, wherein the court awarded plaintiffs
$48,767.25 in attorney's fees and costs. (Addendum at 12) The Judgment, dated April 28,
1999, contained a clerical error as it awarded attorney's fees and costs to plaintiffs, instead
of defendant, (kl.) By stipulation, this Judgment was amended on May 24, 1999, to reflect
the actual ruling of the trial court. (Addendum at 13) On June 1, 1999, the Pavonis filed a
second Notice of Appeal. (Addendum at 14) On June 18, 1999, the parties moved to
consolidate the two appeals for purposes of briefing, oral argument and decision. (Addendum
at 15) The Paxonis seek to reverse the trial court's decision to grant Nielsen's motion for
directed verdict and vacate its award of attorney's fees and costs to Nielsen.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about March 31, 1992, the Pavonis executed an Earnest Money Sales

Agreement with Nielsen for the purchase of real property located in the Red Hawk
Subdivision, Phase I, and described as Lot No. 3 (hereinafter the "property"). (R. at 916;
Trial Tr., p. 77; PL's Trial Ex. 1.)
2.

The Pavonis communicated to Nielsen their desire to build on a specific site

w ithin the property and were adamant about the location of the house on the property. The

1

The January 28, 1999 Order did not specify the amount of attorney's fees and costs
awarded to Nielsen. On October 21, 1998, a hearing was held to allow the parties to present their
arguments with respect to the reasonableness and apportionment of attorney's fees. (R. at 83768.)
9

Pavonib clearly communicated to Nielsen that they had no interest in the property unless they
could build on the specific site. (R. at 917-19, 966, 1000; Trial Tr., pp. 81-90, 277-78, 41315.)
3.

The Pavonis also communicated to Nielsen that they wanted to build on this

pi ease area of the property because it offered an excellent view, privacy, and protection from
the elements. (R. at 917, 1000-01; Trial Tr., pp. 82, 413-15.)
4.

To ensure that they would be able to build on their desired site, the Pavonis

included Paragraph 8 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which specifically states that
the transaction is expressly contingent upon "written acceptance, from the Seller, of the
Buyer's proposed overall site plan." ( PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1 A.)
5.

On or about May 30, 1992, the Pavonis showed Nielsen their desired building

site, and he assured them that they would be able to build on site. (R. at 916-19; Trial Tr.,
pp. 81-90.) This was memorialized in paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1992 Addendum to the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
6.

(R. at 919; Trial Tr., p. 89; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1 A.)

Just prior to closing, Nielsen notified the Pavonis that a Lis Pendens had been

placed on the property by J. Allen and Margaret Call, whereby the Calls sought a right-ofway easement over the property.
7.

(R. at 920; Trial Tr., p. 93; PL's Trial Ex. 3.)

Nielsen represented to the Pavonis that the Call lawsuit had been commenced

against himself and other owners of Red Hawk.
8.

(R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94.)

Nielsen further represented that the Calls' claims of right-of-way easement

over the property would not present a problem for the Pavonis because Nielsen would
10

construct another road to satisfy the Calls' right-of-way claim.

(R. at 920, 983, 994, 1002-

03; Trial Tr., pp. 93-94, 347-48, 423-26; PL's Ex. 38.)
9.

Nielsen repeatedly and consistently represented to the Pavonis that the Calls1

claim would not interfere with the Pavoni's desired building site.

(R. at 920-21, 943-44,

1001; Trial Tr., pp. 96-98, 187-88,417.)
10.

In July of 1992, Nielsen and the Pavonis entered into an agreement whereby

Nielsen agreed to, among other things, defend and indemnify the Pavonis "from and against
any and all claims, demands, damages, losses, liens, liabilities, penalties, fines, costs and
expenses (including attorney's fees), if any, arising directly or indirectly from or out o f the
Call lawsuit (hereinafter the "Indemnification Agreement"). (R. at 920; Trial Tr., pp. 94-95;
PL's Trial Ex.4.)
11.

In reliance upon Nielsen's representations that the Pavonis would have the

unqualified ability to build on their desired site and that Nielsen would fully redress any
adverse impact the Call lawsuit might have on them, on or about July 10, 1992, the Pavonis
executed the necessary documents to close the sale/purchase of the property.

(R. at 921,

1001; Trial Tr., pp. 99, 417.)
12.
(SI 15,000).
13.

The Pavonis purchased the property for One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars
(R. at 948; Trial Tr., pp. 206-07; Def.'s Trial Ex 6.)
By check dated July 28, 1994, Nielsen paid the Pavonis Two Thousand Dollars

($2,000) for legal fees resulting from the Call lawsuit as required by the Indemnification
Agreement.

(R. at 930, 994; Trial Tr., pp. 132, 388; Pl/s Trial Ex. 6.)
11

14.

In connection with paying the Pavonis Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000),

Nielsen wrote Mr. Pavoni a note stating that he was not aware of the exact amount of
attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis, and inviting the Pavonis to contact him if the fees
exceeded $2,000. (PL's Trial Ex. 6.)
15.
litigation.
16.

The Pavonis incurred legal fees in excess of $2,000 as a result of the Call
(R. at 930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp. 132-35; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.)
The Pavonis demanded that Nielsen reimburse them for the legal fees incurred

as a result of the Call litigation.
17.

(R. at 994; Trial Tr., p. 391; PL's Trial Ex. 17.)

Nielsen did not reimburse the Pavonis for legal fees in excess of $2,000

incurred as a result of the Call litigation. (R. at 26, 29, 97-98.)
18.

The Addendum dated June 3, 1992 to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement

provided in paragraph 9 that Nielsen would install additional three-inch gravel from the
driveway entrance on the property to a point twenty feet beyond the Western-most boundary
of the Pavoni's selected home site within one hundred twenty days from the closing date.
(R. at 919, 923, 966; Trial Tr., pp. 90-91, 106, 279; PL's Trial Exs. 1 & 1A.)
19.

Nielsen failed to install the above-described gravel road as promised, and ten

months after the road was supposed to have been completed, the Pavonis had it installed at
their own expense in the amount of approximately Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($4,500).
20.

(R. at 921, 923, 930; Trial Tr., pp. 100, 102-03, 133-35; PL's Trial Ex. 7.)
The Pavonis made demand on Nielsen for the amount it took to have the gravel

road installed, and Nielsen refused to pay. (R. at 27-28.)
12

21

The Addendum dated June 3, 1992 to the Earnest Money Sales Agieement

pio\ idcd in paiagiaph 9 that Nielsen would widen and stiaighten the duveway entiance, as
he had pieuously piomised the Pa\oms on oi about May 30, 1992

(R at 924, 966, Tnal

11 pp 109-10, 279, P i ' s Tnal Cxs 1 & 1A )
22

Nielsen did not widen oi stiaighten the duveway entiance to the Piopeity

(R at 924, Tnal Ti , p 110)
23

In the Spnng of 1993 the Pavonis contiacted with an aichitect to piepaie

constitution plans foi a custom home on the selected building site foi Five Thousand Five
Ilundicd Dollais (S5,500)
24

(R at 921-22, Tnal Ti , pp 100-01)

The Pa\onis made numeious impiovements to the piopeity including, intei

aha, installing utility lines that mcieased the value of the piopeity (R at 923-24, 930-31,
933-37, 963, Tnal Ti , pp 106-12, 133-38, 146-63, 264, Tnal Exs 22, 23, 24, 25, 29 )
25

In connection with lesolvmg the Call lawsuit, Nielsen gianted a light-of-way

casement thiough the pioperty and dnectly thiough the Pavoni's selected building site (R
at 6, 924, 927, 929, 975-76, Tnal l i , pp 112-14,315-19, 121-22, Def's Tnal Ex 9 )
26

The Call easement occupied up to 2 acies of the Pavonis 20-acre pioperty (R

at 977, I n a l l i , pp 320-21 )
27

The Call easement inteifeied with the Pavoni's ability to construct then home

on thui desned building site
28

(R at 944, 967, Tnal Ti , p 191 )

The Call easement also lendcied the Pavoni's aichitectuial plans and

topogiaphical studies useless

(R at 968, Tnal Ti , pp 284-85 )
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Because ol the Call's easement passed dnectly thiough the Pavoni's desned

building site, the Pavonis decided to sell then pioperty and attempt to tecovei any and all
losses due to the Call easement fiom Nielsen
30

Between 1992 and 1994, the values of the piopeities in the Red Hawk

Subdivision escalated
^1

(R at 929, Tnal Tt , p 131 )

(R at 977, Tnal Ti , p 323)

In Septembei, 1994, as a lesult of the escalating land values and because of

substantial impio\ements the Pavonis made to the pioperty, the Pavonis sold then piopeily
foi $282,500 (R at 963, Tnal Ti , pp 265-66 )
32

I he selling pi ice, howe\ei, was $2,500 below the piopeity's appiaised value

(R at 963, HialTi , pp 265-66)
11

Nielsen nevci paid the Pavonis foi the diminution in value of the pioperty by

the imposition of the casement The Pa\onis weie also not leimbuised foi the aichitectuial
plans (S5,500), noi foi then attorney's fees inclined in defending and assessing the
implications of the Call lawsuit (R at 1-32 , PI 's Trial Ex 17)
}4

Despite the evidence ol these damages, the tnal court duected a veidict on the

indemnification claim, finding no damage meiely because the Pavoms sold then pioperty foi
a pi oilt o\ci then onginal pin chase pi ice (R at 610-15, 1011, Tnal Ti , pp 458-59 )
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The tnal court cnoneously duected a veidict and dismissed the Pavom's claim that
Nielsen bleached the Indemnification Agieement The tnal court based its decision on its
finding that because the Pa\onis sold then pioperty foi a piofit, they did not piesent any
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evidence that they weie damaged by Nielsen's bieach of the Indemnity Agieement
1 lowexu the Pavonis intioduced evidence at tnal that they inclined unieimbuised attorney's
tees as a lesult of the Call lawsuit The evidence also demonstiated that the Pavoni's custom
aichitcctuial plans weie lendeied useless by the Call easement and that the value of the
piopeitv was diminished bv the easement which lesulted fiom the Call lawsuit At tnal, the
paities disputed the effect that the Call easement had on the Pavoni's piopeity value The
Pa\ onis howe\ ei, weie entitled to lecovci at least nominal damages, in any event, based on
Nielsen's bieach of the Indemnification Agieement Theiefoie, it was impiopei foi the tnal
couit to dnect a veidict and pi event the juiy fiom detei mining whethei Nielsen bleached the
Indemnity Agieement, and, if so, the extent of the Pavoni's damages

The Pavonis

lespectfully lequest that this Court teveise the decision of the tnal court, vacate the
accompanying awaid of attorney's fees and lemand the case foi a tnal on those issues as to
which the tnal court dnectcd the veidict
1 he tnal court also gianted Nielsen's motion foi dnected \ eidict and dismissed the
Pavoni's claim that Nielsen bleached the tamest Money Sales Agreement The tnal court's
decision was based on its conclusion that the piovisions, teims and obligations contained
within the Earnest Money Sales Agieement meiged with the deed

The tnal court ened,

howevei because it tailed to lecognize that Nielsen's pi onuses to peifoim aftei closing aie
collatcial to the sale of the piopeity, do not meige with the deed, and thus, lemain
uifoiceablc aitci dclixeiy oi the deed The claims at issue in the instant case include, mtei
alia Nielsen's piomise to install additional giavel on the Pavonis dnveway within 120 days
15

attei closing

The expiess language of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement, as well as the

testimony ot Justin and Kimbcily Pa\oni, indicate that Nielsen bleached this piomise
1 hticioic the tual couit ened by not allowing the juiy to weigh this evidence and deteimine
w hethei Nielsen bleached the Earnest Money Sales Agieement The Pavonis aie entitled to
an oidei lexeismg the duected veidict and lemanding the case foi a tual on this issue
ARGUMENT
I

SI A \ D \ R D O I

REVIEW

' Undei Utah law a paity who moves foi a duected \erdict has the \ery difficult
buiaui ol show ing no evidence exists that laises a question of matenal fact " Alta Health
Miatigiis. Inc v CC1 Meih Sen

:

930 P 2d 280, 284 (Utah Ct App 1996), ceLL denied,

916 P 2d 407 (Utah 1997) In addiessmg a motion foi duected veidict, "'wheie theie is any
e\ idence that laises a question ot matenal fact, no mattei how impiobable the evidence may
appeal, judgment as a mattei of law is impiopei "' Id (quoting Kleinert v Kimball Elevatoi
C o , 905 P 2d 297, 299 (Utah Ct App 1995), ceit denied. 913 P 2d 749 (Utah 1996))
1 heicfoie

in diiecting a veidict the [tual] couit is not tiee to weigh the evidence

and thus invade the piovince of the juiy, whose pieiogative it is to judge the facts, but instead
must simply examine whethei evidence laising questions of matenal fact has been
piescntcd "' Alta Health Stiategics, Inc , 930 P 2d at 284 (quoting Management Co mm of
Gia\siom Pines llomeowneis Assoc v Giaystone Pines, Inc, 652 P 2d 896, 897 (Utah
1982))
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In the instant case, the trial court either ignored the above standard in granting
\ i c K e n \ motion foi dnectcd veidict, or the trial court completely disregarded the evidence
that was intioduced at tnal which piesented matenal issues of fact that lequued
determination by thejuiy.
II.

THE PAVONIS RAISED ISSUES OF iMATERIAL FACT REGARDING
NIELSENS BREACH OF THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT
Particulaily when all of the evidence presented at trial is viewed in a light most

\\\\ 01 able to the Pavonis, it cannot be said that Nielsen is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law rcgaidmg the Pavoni's claim that Nielsen breached the Indemnification Agreement. It
ib not foi the court to weigh the evidence which has been presented. Because the evidence
raised questions of material fact, the trial court's directed verdict was improper.
The trial court dnected a verdict in Nielsen's favor and dismissed the Pavoni's claims
that Nielsen bleached the Indemnification Agreement, because it concluded that the Pavoni's
e\ idencc did not establish that they incurred any damage arising out of the Call lawsuit. (R.
at 61 (J-15, 1008-11, Trial Ti\, pp. 444-59 ) However, in addressing a motion for a directed
\ ei diet, the issue is not whether the evidence preponderates in favor of one party or the other;
that is the lole of the juiy As long as the Pavonis have produced evidence raising issues of
fact, then a dnected verdict is inappropriate. See Alta Health Strategies, Inc., 930 P.2d at
284-87 In the instant case, the Pavonis presented evidence that they were damaged as a
result of Nielsen's breach of the Indemnification Agreement.
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1 he Indemnity agiecmcnt states
1
Sellei does heieby agiee to indemnify, defend, save and
hold haimlcss Buyei fiom and against any and all claims,
demands damages, losses, hens, liabilities, penalties, fines,
costs and expenses (including attorney's fees), if any, ansmg
duettly 01 mduectly horn oi out of, the lawsuit Civil No 11110
following the Buyei's puichase of the subject piopeity
(R at 920, fual Ti , pp 94-95, PI 's Tual Ex 4 )
The indemnification that Nielsen piovided to the Pavonis puisuant to paiagiaph one
of the agi cement is bioad

Its language extends the sellers indemnity obligations beyond

attorney's lce^ inclined in the Pa\onf s actual appeaiancc in the Call lawsuit The language
ot the Indemnity Agi cement entitles the Pavonis to lecovei any and all losses, costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees, "ausing dnectly oi mduectly fiom oi out of the Call
I \\\ suit '
Despite the bioad language of the Indemnification Agieement, the tual couit
disiegaided the evidence of damages inclined by the Pavonis as a lesult of the Call lawsuit,
which was piesented at tual The evidence of damages included the cost of custom
aichitcctuial plans designed foi a specific site on the lot, that weie rendeied useless by the
giant of the easement to the Calls in settlement of the Call lawsuit Mi Pavoni testified that
he paid ,\n aidutect $5,500 foi a suney, topogiaphic depictions, site plans and design

If am question exists as to the meaning oi scope of the indemnity piousion, the teim*
ol the agieement must be constiued against Nielsen, as its diaftei, (R at 990, Tual Ti , pp 374
*)) and in i i\oi ot the Pa\oms See Jones, Waldo, Holbiook &. McDonough v. Dawson. 923
P2d 1^60 1^2 (Utah 1990) i^L dlhQ Restatement (Second) of Contiacls ^ 206 (1981), 3
Aithui 1 Coibm Coibin on Contiacb ^ 5^9 (1960)
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specifications toi the home (R at 921-22, Tnal l i , p p 100-01) These plans wcie iendeied
useless by the Call easement and the Pavonis subsequently decided to give these
topogiaphical documents to the puichaset

(R at 963-64, Tual Ti , pp 267-68 )

In addition the Pa\oms piesented evidence indicating that the \alue of the piopeity
was diminished as a lesult of the Call easement

In fact, upon diiect examination, Nielsen

admitted that the Paxoni's piopeity value was I educed because of the existence of the Call
easement
MR TFSCH
Sine If I undeistand you conectly,
eveiy easement in favoi of a neighboi going acioss a piece of
piopeity would diminish it, the value of the piopeity it's going
o\ ei, in some w ay oi othei And it would be moi e depending on
the seventy of the use of the casement 9

THE WITNESS
youi question conectly

Yes I would say that if I undeistand

MR TESCH
Uh-huh Eveiy piece of propeity
does not ha\ e an easement \ eisus it does have an easement, then
>ou aic saying that the piopeity with an easement would have
a diminution of value 9 That's a tuie statement 7
1 HF WITNESS

Yes, I would say that's conect

(R at 974 I n a l Ti p MO lines 16-21 25, p 111 lines 2-7 )

MR TESCH
[D]o you have an opinion as to
whethei oi not that easement by judgment diminished the value
of Lot 3^
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THE WITNESS' I would say that the value of the
pioperty with that easement would be less than that property
without an easement

iM R TESCH*
[H]ow much would the value of the
lot have been diminished, what amount of money?
THE WITNESS*

It probably would have been a little

bit.

(R. at 977; Trial Tr., p. 321, lines 24-25, p 322, lines 13-15, p. 323, lines 11-13, p 323, line
14)

0
Mr Nielsen, based on all the hypothetical we have,
assuming the existence of a roadway through the Call property
that you agreed to in the judgment and that it had a like use only
ioi the Call pioperty as it cunently exists and as it existed,
lather, in July 1992, how much would that have Ieduced the
value of Lot 3? How much money?

THE WITNESS:
I would say it would be a diminished value
of possibly a couple of thousand dollars.
(R at 981; Trial Tr., p 336, lines 6-12, 24-25 )'
It is not disputed that the property appraised for $285,000 and sold for $282,500. (R
at 963, Trial Tr., pp. 266-67; Def.'s Trial Exs. 1 & 7.) Nielsen contends that the sale's price
of the property was not impacted by the Call easement, but, instead, was the result of a
negotiation between the buyei and scllei, wheicm the buyei offeied $280,000 and the parties

Nielsen also conceded that, depending on the extent of the use of the easement, the
existence of the easement could dimmish the value of the Pavoni's property by as much as 50%.
(R at 978, lual h , p 127 )
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met in the middle (R at 963, Tnal 11 , p 267 ) In contrast, evidence was piesented, in the
foim of Nielsen's testimony, that suggested the value of then piopeity was diminished
because ot the existence of the Call easement (R at 974, 977, 981, Tiial Ti , pp 310,32122 3 36 ) 1 he incuts of the parties' positions with lespect to the effect of the easement on
the piopeit) value should ha\e been consideied by thejuiy

4

Unfoitunately, the tiial couit

duected the \eidict in this case and pi evented thejuiy fiom lesolving whethei, and to what
amount, the Pavonis had been damaged by the Call lawsuit and the existence of the Call
easement
In concluding that the Pavonis vveie not damaged by the Call lawsuit, the tiial couit
ignoicd pioof that Nielsen leimbuised only a poition ($2,000 00) of the attorney's fees
inclined by the Pavonis as a lesult of the Call lawsuit

It is important to note that the

indemnification agieement is not limited to attorney's fees inclined m the Call lawsuit, but
is much bioadei, and coveis attorney's fees ansing fiom, oi inclined as a lesult of, the Call
lawsuit
In the instant case, the Pavonis intioduced evidence at tiial that they inclined
attorney's fees and costs that constituted damages arising duectly oi indiiectly fiom oi out
ot the ( all litigation Spccificall) the Pa\oms piesented Exhibits Nos 35A and 35B which
set f oi th the attorney's fees that the Pavom's inclined as a lesult of the Call litigation

Below, the Pavom's tnal counsel aigucd that the Pavom's damages foi the diminution
ol then piopeity's value should be mcasuied at the time the Pavonis pin chased the piopeity (R
at 1010, Tnal Ti , pp 454-55 ) Theiefoie, based on Nielsen's own admission, the Pa\onis paid
SI 15 000 ioi piopeity that was woith no moie than $113,000 Nielsen's testimony in itself,
constitutes pioof of damages (R at 981, rual Ti , pp 336-37 )
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I \hibits 3D A and 35B vveie intioduced and leceived into evidence (R at 551, 932, 939-40,
lua! 11 pp 42 lines 6-23 169-70, 171-72, 174, lines 15-25)
L \hibitb 35A and 35B demonstiate that the Pavonis paid at least $4,977 59 in
atiomey's tees to lesolve issues lelated, eithei dnectly oi mdiiectly, to the Call litigation "
It is undisputed that Nielsen paid the Pavonis $2,000 puisuant to his obligation to leimbuisc
them foi damages including attorney's fees, lesulting either dnectly oi mdiiectly fiom the
Call litigation (R at 930, Tnal Ti , pp 132-33) Attnal, Mi Pavoni testified that he paid
moie than $2,000 in attorney's fees in a failed effort to lesolve the pioblems cieated by the
Call litigation (R 930, Tnal I i , p p 132-33, PI s Tnal Ex 6 )
Specifically, Mi Pa\oni testified as follows
MR TrscH
A

M R TESCH

A
Q
A

Mi Pavoni, I'm handing you Exhibit No 6 and
ask you it you lecognize that exhibit 7
I do

And this is check number-this is a check fiom
Red Hawk Ranch payable to you foi the amount
of $2000 foi attorney fees, is that light 9
That is conect, sn
And attached theieto is a note fiom Mike Nielsen,
is that coiiect?
Yes MI, it is

Exhibits 35A & 35B consist ot canceled checks made payable to the Pavoni's attorneys
and invoices iiom the Paxoni s attorneys 1 he sum ol the checks and invoices enteied into
L\ iduice thiough Exhibits 35A & 35B actually equals $5,929 56 The disciepancy between the
exhibits and the tnal testimony is lendeied ununpoitant by the fact that both sums aie gieatei
than the $2 000 that Nielsen paid to the Pavonis, and thus, constitute evidence of damages
icsulling iioin Nielsen s bicach ol the Indemnification Agieement
9?

Q.

Was that the total extent of the attorneys fees that
you incurred up to the time that you had hired
trial counsel?

A.

No sir.

(R. at. 930; Trial Tr., pp. 132-33.)
Accordingly, the testimony of Mr. Pavoni, together with the invoices and checks
contained in Exhibits 35 A and 35B, is more than sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude
that the Pavonis were damaged in the amount of at least $2,977.59 in connection with paying
attorney's fees to resolve the issues that arose from the Call litigation.6 Evidence was
admitted that showed that the Pavonis incurred attorney's fees relating directly or indirectly
to the Call lawsuit that were not reimbursed by Nielsen. (R. at 930, 940-41; Trial Tr., pp.
312-33, 172-80; PL's Trial Exs. 35A & 35B.) These attorney's fees constitute damages
relating to Nielsen's breach of the Indemnity Agreement and, thus, render the trial court's
grant of a directed verdict improper.
The trial court's error appears, in part, to be the result of its failure to distinguish
between attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis relating to the Call litigation as contrasted
with the attorney's fees incurred by the Pavonis in their suit against Nielsen. Fees incurred
either directly or indirectly as a result of the Call litigation should have been considered by
The record is unclear as to whether Exhibit 35 was also received into evidence. Exhibit
35 consists of a summary of the Pavoni's legal fees in the amount of $8388.55. (Addendum at
28) Exhibit 35 specifically states that these legal fees do not include fees that the Pavonis paid to
their trial attorneys. This exhibit is contained within the exhibits in the trial court's record.
Moreover, Judge Brian's clerk has marked Exhibit 35 as offered and received. (R. at 551.)
Nielsen's counsel objected to Exhibit 35 when it was originally introduced into evidence. (R. at
932; Trial Tr., p. 142.) The trial court did not sustain or overrule this objection, but, instead
reserved this issue until additional foundation could be laid. Id.
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the jury as damages at trial. Fees incurred in the Pavoni v. Nielsen lawsuit were properly
reserved for post-trial consideration. On at least two occasions during trial, the trial court
prevented the Pavoni's counsel from eliciting testimony to clarify that the attorney's fees
constituted damages incurred as a result of the Call litigation, as opposed to fees incurred in
the instant case. (R. at 941, 944; Trial Tr., pp. 178, 181.) The trial court mistakenly believed
that any issues regarding attorney's fees should be resolved by the court after trial. Id.
Therefore, the trial court directed the verdict without considering the attorney's fees incurred
by the Pavonis as a result of the Call litigation. The trial court subsequently refused to
consider these fees as damages at the close of the case based on the circular logic that it had
already granted a directed verdict. (R. at 725-42, 865; Trial Tr., p. 29.) Either way, it was
error—evidence of unpaid attorney's fees covered by the Indemnification Agreement was
ignored.
The cost of the architectural plans that were rendered obsolete by the Call easement,
the diminution of the property's value and the attorney's fees paid by the Pavonis to resolve
issues relating to the Call litigation, all constitute damages incurred by the Pavonis "arising
directly or indirectly from or out of, the [Call] lawsuit." Accordingly, the trial court erred
by directing a verdict and preventing the jury from considering the Pavoni's claim that
Nielsen breached the Indemnity Agreement. Therefore, the Pavonis respectfully request that
this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and remand this case back to the trial court for
further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court's award of costs and attorney's fees to
Nielsen should also be vacated.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DIRECTED VERDICT AND DISMISSAL OF THE
PAVONPS CLAIMS UNDER THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WAS
ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE, AT A MINIMUM, THE PAVONIS INCURRED
NOMINAL DAMAGES
While the Pavonis were able to quantify their damages through c\ idence introduced

at trial, all that was required to defeat Nielsen's motion for directed verdict was to
demonstrate a breach of contract, which alone supports an award of nominal damages. In
Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCA Mech. Serv.r 930 P.2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1996), cert.
denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997), this Court reversed the trial court's grant of directed
\eidict

1 ike the instant case, the plaintiffs claims in Alta Health were dismissed because

the trial court concluded that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence of damages.
LI .it 286-87

In reversing the trial court, this Court recognized that:
"nominal damages are recoverable upon a breach of contract if
no actual or substantial damages resulted from the breach or if
the amount of damages has not been proven." Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,
670 (Utah 1982). Likewise, a party who has breached a contract
will not ordinarily escape liability merely because the amount of
damages is uncertain. Gould v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
6 Utah 2d 187, 193, 309 P.2d 802, 805-06 (1957); accord Terry
v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1981). Therefore, even if
the amount of damages was not proven, the court still should not
have granted a directed verdict on the breach of warranty and
breach of contract claims.

id. at 286.
Here, Pavoni showed that Nielsen breached the Indemnity Agreement by settling the
Call litigation, granting an easement through the Pavoni's property, and failing to defend the
Pavoni's interests. (R. at 979-80, 991, 993, 996-98; Trial Tr., pp. 329-30, 332-33, 379, 38525

86, 399-405 ) Accoidingl), the tiial couit ened by duecting a veidict in Nielsen's favoi and
pie\entmg the Pavonis fiom picsenting then claims undei the Indemnification Agieement
and ictovciing at least nominal damages
i\.

I HI PAVONIS RAISED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING
NIELSEN'S BREACH OF THE EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
WHIC H WERF NOT ABROGATED OR MERGED INTO THE DEED
In gi inMng Nielsen's motion foi a ducctcd veidict, the tiial couit lehed on the

doctnne of meigei The tnal couit held that the Pavoni's claims that Nielsen breached the
Fainest Money Sales Agieement weie abiogated and meiged into the deed (R at 610-15
1008 Tnal H , pp 444-47)
The tnal court's conclusion was enoneous, howevei, because the Pavom's claims of
bieach of contiact included claims that Nielsen failed to fulfill piomises contained in the
Fainest Monc> Sales Agieement that weie collateial to the contiact of sale (R at 98-99 )
1 he tnal LOUII enoncouslv failed to apply the well-established exceptions to the meigei
doctnne

"The meigei doctnne has foui disciete exceptions

(1) mutual mistake in the

diaftmg of the final documents, (2) ambiguity in the final documents, (3) existence of lights
collateial to the contract of sale, and (4) fiaud in the tiansaction " Maynaid v. Wharton. 912
P 2d 446, 450 (Utah Ct App ), £erL denied, 919 P 2d 1208 (Utah 1996), accoid Secoi v
Knight 716 P 2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986), Stubbs v Hemmeit 567 P 2d 168, 169-70 (Utah
1977), Cmbassy Gioup, Inc v Hatch, 865 P 2d 1366, 1371-72 (Utah Ct App 1993)
Paiagiaph O of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement contains an abiogation clause
that piovides ' Except ioi expiess vvananties made in this Agieement, execution and delneiy
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of final closing documents shall abiogate this Agieement " The trial couit adopted Nielsen's
aigument that the exceptions to the meigei doctune weie inapplicable to the Pavom's claims
because, upon dehveiy of the deed, the abiogation clause piecluded all claims not contained
in the expiess vvananties (R at 612, 1008, Tnal Ti , pp 444-47 ) In Maynaid v Whaiton,
y 12 P 2d 446, 449-^0 (Utah C t App ),ceit denied, 919 P 2d 1208 (Utah 1996), this Couit
addiessed the effect of an abiogation clause with identical language as that found in this case
The Maynaid couit stated that "[t]he abiogation clause at issue heie is typical, it provides
"Except foi expiess wananties made in this Agieement, execution and dehveiy of final
closing documents shall abiogate this Agieement" id at 450

In Maynaid, this Couit

iecogni7ed that "[t]he doctune of meigei is "loutmely applied when an antecedent agieement
contains an abiogation clause " Id (quoting Embassy Gioup, 865 P 2d at 1371 ) In fact, the
Maxnatd couit stated that "[a]n abiogation clause is a conti actual statement of the common
law doctune ot meigei ' Maynaid, 912 P 2d at 450 The Maynaid Couit then expiessly
acknowledged the "foui disciete exceptions" to the meigei doctune which include mtei alia
that lights expiessed in an Earnest Money Sales Agieement that aie "collateial to the contiact
of sale" aie not meiged into the deed upon delivery. Id Theiefoie, contiaiy to Nielsen's
aiizument below which the tnal couit adopted, the doctune of abiogation oi meigei does not
ippl> to the bleaches of contiact asseited by the Pa\onis in this case
In the case at bai, the Pavonis piesented evidence which laised issues of matetial tact
legending Nielsen's bieach of the Famest Money Sales Agieement, including, but not
ncLLssanly limited to, Nielsen's pi onuses of futuie peifoimance to make imptovements to
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(he piopeitv As the Utah Supieme Court stated in Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P 2d 168, 169-70
(I tab 1977)
[I]f the onginal contiact calls foi peifoimance by the sellei of
some act collateial to conveyance of title, his obligations with
lespect heieto suivive the deed and aie not extinguished by it
Whcthei the tcims of the contiact aie collateial, oi aie part of
the obligation to conxcy and theiefoie unenforceable aftei
deliveiy of the deed, depends to a gieat extent on the intent of
the parties with lespect theieto When sellers peifoimance is
intended by the parties to take place at some time aftei the
deliveiy of the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated
by the parties that deliveiy of the deed would constitute full
peifoimance on the part of the sellei, absent some manifest
intent to the contiaiy
Id (emphasis added )
"Collateial teims may take vanous foims " Embassy Gioup, Inc , 865 P 2d at 1372
Poi example, in Stubbs, the parties executed an earnest money and exchange agieement
w hich piovided that the sellei could iemo\e fiom the building "all equipment and shelving"
except the "two walk-in cooleis with then cooling equipment " 567 P 2d at 170 In Stubbs,
it was cleai fiom the testimony that the parties intended that plaintiff should be allowed to
lea\e his equipment and shelving in the building until aftei the deliveiy of the deed
Accoidingly, in Stubbs, the Utah Supieme Court found that the bleaches complained of by
the plaintiffs ielated to futuie peifoimance by the defendant and, thus, weie not extinguished
bv the doctnne of meigei id_
In dctcimining whethei the piousions m an earnest money sales agieement aie
collateial to the deliveiy of the deed and title to the subject lot, it is necessaiy to look at the
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paitics' intent Stubbs, 567 P 2d at 169-70 "When [the] sellers peifotmance is intended
b\ the panics to lake place at some time aftei the dehveiy of the deed it cannot be said that
it was contemplated by the paities that dehveiy of the deed would constitute full peifoimance
on the pait of the sellci, absent some manifest intent to the contiaiy " Id. Stated anothci
way the teims ot an earnest money conttact aie not extinguished by the meigei doctnnc
*\\hen the dehveiy of the deed [is] less than full peifoimance of the sellers obligations "
Id.

In the instant case, the evidence mtioduced at tiial was moie than sufficient toi the
jinx lo conclude thatw the dehveiy of the deed was less than full peifoimance of the seller s
obligations " 1 he hamest Money Sales Agieement lequiied Nielsen "to install additional
^ inch giavel fiom dnveway entiance on Lot #3 to 20 feet beyond Western-most boundaiy
oi the home site within 120 days horn date oi closing " (R at 919, 926, 966, Tiial Ti , pp
90-91, 279, PI 's Tiial Exs 1 & 1A ) The Earnest Money Sales Agieement also piovided
that Nielsen would widen and stiaighten the dnveway entrance (R at 924, 966, Tnal Ti ,
pp 109-10, 279, PI 's Tnal E\b 1 & 1A ) This evidence was mtioduced at tnal by way of
exhibit and thiough the testimony of Justin Pavoni, Kimbeily Pavoni and C Michael Nielsen
Id At tnal, Nielsen and the Pavonis disputed what obligations vveie confeiied on Nielsen
b\ these piovisions in the Earnest Money Sales Agieement

Foi example, the paities

disputed what amount of giavel was lequiied and what constituted stiaightening and
widening the dnveway (R at 914, 946, Tnal Ti , pp 110, 199 ) What cannot be disputed,
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hov\c\u, is that the language of the agieeincnt and the evidence introduced at tiial
dcmonstiated that this woik was to be done aftei closing
As a mattei ol law, the meigci doctune does not insulate Nielsen fiom liability foi
piomises to pcifoim aftei the date of closing that aie collateral to the contiact of sale If the
tiial comt had not euoneously dnected a \eidict in Nielsen's favoi, the Pavonis would have
had the buidcn ot pioving then bieach ol contiact claims by apiepondeiance of the evidence
\\ hethei Nielsen bleached the Tainest Money Sales Agieement by failing to peifoim
m onuses which weie collateial to the contiact of sale is a question foi the juiy based upon
the facts piesented at tiial I h e tual court eued, as a mattei of law, by disiegaidmg evidence
whicli laiscd issues of matenal lact and dnecting a \ eidict, lathei than allowing the juiy to
detcimine these issues of fact

Accoidmgly, the tiial couit eued in concluding that the

Pa\onfs claims with lespect to Nielsen's bieach of the Earnest Money Sales Agieement
meiged into 01 weie abiogated by the deed Thetefoie, this Couit should levetse the tiial
court's giant of dnected \ eidict and lemand this case back to the tiial court foi fuithei
pioceedings
\\

BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE VERDICT
AND DISMISSING THE PAVONI'S CLAIMS, THE TRIAL C O U R T S
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO NIELSEN WAS ALSO IMPROPER.
The Indemnification Agieement piovides
If any legal action undei this Agieement 01 by reason of any
asserted bieach of it, [t]he prevailing party ccshall be entitled to

Upon luuand the tiial court s awaid ol costs and attorney's fees to Nielsen should also
be \ acated
10

recover all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's
fees, incurred in enforcing or attempting to enforce any of the
terms, covenants, or conditions of this Agreement, including
costs incurred prior to commencement of legal action.
The trial court concluded that Nielsen was "the prevailing party" with respect to the
dispute involving the Indemnification Agreement, based on the verdict which the court
directed in his favor. Because the trial court's directing the verdict and dismissing the claims
of breach of the Indemnity Agreement and breach of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement
was improper, the award of attorney's fees to Nielsen is also untenable.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in directing the verdict in this case. The trial court failed to
consider the evidence presented demonstrating that the Pavonis had been damaged by
Nielsen's breach of the Indemnity Agreement. The trial court also misapplied the doctrine
of merger. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment,
vacate its award of attorney's fees to Nielsen and remand this matter to the trial court for
further proceedings.
DATED this a 1 S * day of June, 1999.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

Alan Sullivan
David N. Wolf
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 do hereby declare that on this

<*J

day of June, 1999, I caused to be mailed two

(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to each of the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
A \ D I RSON & KARRENBERG

50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Sail Lake City, Utah 84101
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